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FOREWORD: LAWYERS AND LINGUISTS 
COLLABORATE IN USING CORPUS LINGUISTICS 
TO PRODUCE NEW INSIGHTS INTO ORIGINAL 
MEANING 
 
Clark D. Cunningham* 
 
On August 23, 2019, the Supreme Court of Idaho published a 
decision that sent an explicit signal to lawyers in its jurisdiction: 
“We . . . reference the use of corpus linguistic tools as a support for 
our analysis . . . and as an motivation for counsel to consider 
this . . . tool . . . for statutory interpretation . . . when called for in the 
future.”1 The Idaho decision occupied the midpoint in a 
forty-five-day period during which two other appellate courts also 
explicitly used research based on “corpus linguistics” to support 
statutory interpretation decisions. The first of these cases was decided 
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on 
August 1, 2019,2 and the third decision issued in this short period was 
published by the Supreme Court of Utah on September 13, 2019.3 
At the end of May 2019, a three-judge panel of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit went a step further than the 
“motivation” given by the Idaho Supreme Court. The panel explicitly 
directed the United States Department of Justice and the appointed 
counsel in a federal prisoner habeas case to file supplemental briefs 
addressing “how does” a specific linguistic corpus (the Corpus of 
Founding Era American English) “help inform” a determination “of 
the original meaning of the Article III Cases or Controversies 
requirement.”4 Although the court in that case did not end up using 
                                                                                                                                             
* Professor of Law and W. Lee Burge Chair in Law & Ethics, Georgia State University College of Law, 
cdcunningham@gsu.edu, www.clarkcunningham.org. 
 1.  State v. Lantis, 447 P.2d 875, 880 (Idaho 2019) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted) (using data from Corpus of Historical American English regarding use of “disturbing 
the peace” in 1887). 
 2. Caesars Entm’t Corp. v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 932 F.3d 91, 95 (3d Cir. 2019) (using 
data from Corpus of Historical American English regarding use of “previously”). 
 3.  Richards v. Cox, 450 P.3d 1074, 1079–81 (Utah 2019) (using Corpus of Contemporary 
American English and Corpus of Historical American English to investigate the meaning of 
“employment” in the Utah Constitution). For further citations to published judicial opinions specifically 
discussing corpus-based research, see Resources on Law & Linguistics, CLARKCUNNINGHAM.ORG, 
http://www.clarkcunningham.org/Law-Linguistics.html [https://perma.cc/U666-KSRT] (last visited 
Mar. 8, 2019).  
 4.  Letter to Counsel at 1, Wright v. Spaulding, 939 F.3d 695 (6th Cir. 2019) (No. 17-4257). 
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the linguistic research that it received,5 a member of that panel wrote 
a long concurring opinion in another case decided in July 2019, 
explaining that “corpus linguistics is a powerful tool for discerning 
how the public would have understood a statute’s text at the time it 
was enacted.”6 
Corpus linguistics has not only recently attracted judicial attention 
but also has been generating considerable legal scholarship. Over 
twenty-five law review articles have been written on the subject since 
2016,7 including, in the past two years, several published in some of 
the country’s leading law reviews.8 
“Corpus linguistics” is not, as recently suggested by a 
tongue-in-cheek newspaper column, the name of “a singer in a punk 
band.”9 A digitized data set representing actual language—typically a 
very large data set—is called by the science of linguistics a “corpus” 
(plural: corpora).10 “Corpus linguistics” is a short-hand term applied 
to a wide variety of ways linguists use computer technology to 
acquire, store, and process such data and then analyze it to document 
and describe patterns of natural language usage, often to solve 
real-world problems.11 The recent virtual explosion of interest in 
using linguistic analysis of corpus data for legal interpretation can be 
traced back12 to a 2010 law review student note by Stephen 
Mouritsen13 and a 2011 concurring opinion by Utah Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                                             
 5.  See Haoshan Ren et al., “Questions Involving National Peace and Harmony” or “Injured 
Plaintiff Litigation”? The Original Meaning of “Cases” in Article III of the Constitution, infra 36 GA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 535, 547–48 (2020). 
 6.  Wilson v. Safelite Grp., Inc., 930 F.3d 429, 438–45 (6th Cir. 2019) (Thapar, J., concurring). 
 7.  For citations, see Resources on Law & Linguistics, supra note 3.  
 8.  See Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127 YALE L.J. 788 
(2018); Thomas R. Lee & James C. Phillips, Data-Driven Originalism, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 261 (2019); 
Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 443 (2018); Kevin P. 
Tobia, Testing Ordinary Meaning: An Experimental Assessment of What Dictionary Definitions and 
Linguistic Usage Data Tell Legal Interpreters, 133 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020).  
 9.  Scott Martelle, Opinion, Word Nerds Take on ‘Emoluments,’ and Deliver a Verdict Sure to 
Anger Trump, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2019, 1:05 PM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/enterthefray/la-
ol-trump-emoluments-constitution-20190130-story.html [https://perma.cc/5F3N-J2CV]. 
 10.  Clark D. Cunningham & Jesse Egbert, Using Empirical Data to Investigate the Original 
Meaning of “Emolument” in the Constitution, infra 36 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 465, 473 (2020). 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Clark D. Cunningham & Jesse Egbert, Corpora and Analyzing Legal Discourse in the United 
States, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CORPUS APPROACHES TO DISCOURSE ANALYSIS (Eric Friginal & 
Jack Hardy eds., forthcoming 2020), pre-publication draft available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3554023. 
 13.  Stephen C. Mouritsen, The Dictionary Is Not a Fortress: Definitional Fallacies and a 
Corpus-Based Approach to Plain Meaning, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1915 (2010). 
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Justice Thomas Rex Lee,14 written while Mouritsen was clerking for 
Justice Lee.  
To my knowledge, with the exception of that 2011 concurrence by 
Justice Lee, none of the judicial opinions published referencing 
linguistic analysis of corpus data were developed with the assistance 
of someone with formal training in linguistics. Likewise, with a few 
notable exceptions, the many law review articles discussing corpus 
linguistics published prior to 2020 do not include an author who 
holds a Ph.D. in linguistics or an academic post in that field.15 To 
promote and demonstrate the value of law-linguistic collaboration in 
applying corpus linguistics to legal interpretation, the College of Law 
and the Department of Applied Linguistics and English as a Second 
Language at Georgia State University jointly sponsored a full-day 
workshop on October 18, 2019.16 Four of the five papers presented at 
that workshop were coauthored by one or more 
internationally-known linguists,17 and the two lawyers who 
coauthored the fifth paper received mentoring from one of the 
                                                                                                                                             
 14.  In re Adoption of Baby E.Z., 266 P.3d 702, 715–32 (Utah 2011) (Lee, J., concurring). 
 15.  Exceptions include Edward Finegan, Comments on James C. Phillips & Jesse Egbert, Advancing 
Law and Corpus Linguistics: Importing Principles and Practices from Survey and Content-Analysis 
Methodologies to Improve Corpus Design and Analysis, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1297 (2017); Stefan Th. 
Gries & Brian G. Slocum, Ordinary Meaning and Corpus Linguistics, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1417 (2017); 
James C. Phillips & Jesse Egbert, Advancing Law and Corpus Linguistics: Importing Principles and 
Practices from Survey and Content-Analysis Methodologies to Improve Corpus Design and Analysis, 
2017 BYU L. REV. 1589 (2017); Lawrence M. Solan, Can Corpus Linguistics Help Make Originalism 
Scientific?, 126 YALE L.J.F. 57 (2016); Lawrence M. Solan, Patterns in Language and Law, 6 INT'L J. 
LANGUAGE & L. 46 (2017); and Lawrence M. Solan & Tammy Gales, Corpus Linguistics as a Tool in 
Legal Interpretation, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1311 (2018). 
 16.  Video of the workshop as well as PowerPoints presented by authors and commentators are 
available at Workshop on Law & Linguistics, CLARKCUNNINGHAM.ORG,  
http://www.clarkcunningham.org/Workshop-Law-Linguistics.html [https://perma.cc/26GK-Z9J4] (last 
visited Mar. 8, 2019) [hereinafter Workshop Website]. The workshop was supported by grants from the 
Faculty Development Committee of the Georgia State University College of Law and from the Office of 
the Provost, Georgia State University, through the Study in a Second Discipline fellowship program. 
 17.  Jesse Egbert, Associate Professor of Applied Linguistics, Northern Arizona University, 
coauthored Using Empirical Data to Investigate the Original Meaning of “Emolument” in the 
Constitution and “Questions Involving National Peace and Harmony” or “Injured Plaintiff Litigation”? 
The Original Meaning of “Cases” in Article III of the Constitution; Ute Römer, Associate Professor of 
Applied Linguistics and English as a Second Language, Georgia State University, also coauthored 
Original Meaning of Cases and coauthored “We the Citizens?”: A Corpus Linguistic Inquiry into the 
Use of “People” and “Citizens” in the Founding Era; and Tammy Gales, Associate Professor of  
Comparative Literature, Languages, and Linguistics, Hofstra University, coauthored Revisiting a Classic 
Problem in Statutory Interpretation: Is a Minister a Laborer? with Lawrence Solan, a law professor 
who also holds a Ph.D. in linguistics. For information about the academic accomplishments of these 
linguists, see Author Biographies, infra. 
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founding figures in the field.18 The five papers presented at this 
workshop were then developed into the five articles comprising this 
Special Issue on Law and Linguistics. The United States Constitution 
prohibits federal officials from receiving any “present, Emolument, 
Office or Title” from a foreign state without the consent of 
Congress.19 However, in trying to determine the meaning of 
emolument, courts are confronted with a term that might as well be a 
foreign word from an unknown language because the word 
emolument has virtually vanished from contemporary American 
English. At the time of writing, cases are pending in three federal 
circuits alleging that President Donald Trump is violating the 
Constitution by receiving business-based revenue generated in part 
from payments by foreign states. These cases prompted Jesse Egbert 
and me to undertake a corpus linguistics research project that asked: 
“Is there evidence that Americans in the Founding Era could have 
used the word emolument to describe revenue derived from 
ownership of a hotel?” Our analysis of data from the Corpus of 
Founding Era American English, reported in this issue’s first article, 
Using Empirical Data to Investigate the Original Meaning of 
“Emolument” in the Constitution,20 found that emolument was 
frequently used with modifying adjectives and prepositional phrases, 
indicating that eighteenth-century writers often needed to constrain or 
specify the word’s broad meaning. We further discovered that 
emolument often functioned as a catch-all term of inclusion and that 
its use in lists ending “and other emoluments” produced evidence that 
at least twenty-five different nouns could be described as a type of 
emolument. We conclude that Founding Era Americans could indeed 
have used emolument to describe revenue derived from ownership of 
a hotel and cite several actual examples where emolument was used 
to refer to revenue from ownership interest in a business.  
In this issue’s second article, Revisiting a Classic Problem in 
Statutory Interpretation: Is a Minister a Laborer?,21 Tammy Gales 
and Lawrence Solan present a new analysis of an iconic 1892 U.S. 
                                                                                                                                             
 18.  During the research and writing process, Edward Finegan, Professor of Linguistics and Law, 
Emeritus, University of Southern California, reviewed and commented on Eleanor Miller & Heather 
Obelgoner, Effective but Limited: A Corpus Linguistic Analysis of the Original Public Meaning of 
Executive Power, infra 36 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 605 (2020). 
 19.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. 
 20.  Cunningham & Egbert, supra note 10. 
 21.  Tammy Gales & Lawrence M. Solan, Revisiting a Classic Problem in Statutory Interpretation: 
Is a Minister a Laborer?, infra 36 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 491 (2020). 
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Supreme Court case—Holy Trinity Church v. United States.22 The 
question in Holy Trinity Church concerned whether a law making it 
illegal to pay the transportation of a person entering the U.S. under 
contract to perform “labor or service of any kind” applied to a  
Manhattan church that had paid to bring its new rector from England 
to New York. The Supreme Court unanimously ruled that the law did 
not apply to the church’s contract, relying first on the ordinary 
meaning of “labor” and second on the legislative history of the 
phrase “labor or service.” Highlighting the use of corpus linguistic 
methods in corpora of general and statutory language, the study by 
Gales and Solan demonstrates that the  phrase “labor or service” did 
appear in the nineteenth century to be a legal term of art with a 
narrow interpretation that would exclude clergy; but, within a few 
decades of the Holy Trinity decision, the phrase began to be applied 
to contexts with broader meaning: first, in the general corpus, and, 
eventually, in the statutory corpus. Such changes were marked by 
changes in pluralization and modification to the terms in question. 
Additionally, when examining “labor” as an independent term, Gales 
and Solan found that those who “labored” were generally not clergy 
and the activities of clergy were typically not described as “labor.” 
If a federal official is deliberately violating the Constitution, is it 
possible that no federal court has the power to halt that conduct? 
Federal judges have been answering “yes” for more than a century—
dismissing certain kinds of lawsuits alleging unconstitutional conduct 
by ruling that the lawsuits were not “cases” as meant in the phrase 
“The judicial Power shall extend to all cases”23 in Article III, Section 
Two of the Constitution. The empirical research reported in this 
issue’s third article, “Questions Involving National Peace and 
Harmony” or “Injured Plaintiff Litigation”? The Original Meaning 
of “Cases” in Article III of the Constitution,24 suggests that the 
Court’s current interpretation of the meaning of “cases” may be more 
narrow—perhaps indeed entirely different—than how the word in its 
Article III context would have been used and understood by those 
who drafted and ratified the Constitution. The authors—a 
seven-member team comprised of five linguists, myself, and a 
practicing lawyer—conclude that (1) during the drafting process the 
                                                                                                                                             
 22.  144 U.S. 457 (1892). 
 23.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 24.  Ren et al., supra note 5. For a thoughtful review and critique by Susan Smelcer, a Georgia State 
law professor specializing in legal analytics, see video and PowerPoint at Workshop Website, supra note  
16. 
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Article III phrase “cases arising under laws” was recurrently 
understood as one type of a general and expansive jurisdiction 
described in earlier drafts of the Constitution as questions involving 
the national peace and harmony; and (2) “cases” as used in various 
parts in Article III did not have a stable, inherent meaning such as 
“litigation in court”—instead “cases” in each different Article III 
context would have been read as having a different meaning, 
constructed through its combination with accompanying words. 
Article I of the Constitution begins by providing that “[a]ll 
legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of 
the United States,”25 whereas Article II simply states “[t]he executive 
Power shall be vested in a President of the United States.”26 As 
Eleanor Miller and Heather Obelgoner point out in the fourth article 
of this issue, Effective but Limited: A Corpus Linguistic Analysis of 
the Original Public Meaning of Executive Power,27 advocates of a 
strong presidency have pointed to the different phrasing of Articles I 
and II to argue that, unlike congressional authority, which is 
expressly limited to the powers specifically enumerated in Article I, 
presidential authority extends to the full reach of whatever is meant 
by “the executive power.” Miller and Obelgoner combine corpus 
linguistics and historical research to marshal evidence that the 
original meaning of the “executive power” was probably much more 
limited than contemporary conceptions. For example, modern 
descriptions of the President as the “Chief Executive Officer” suggest 
that the President is “in charge” of the country in the same way that a 
corporate CEO runs a company. However, while their study of data 
from the Corpus of Contemporary American English shows that 96% 
of uses of “chief executive officer” in a random sample of modern 
English referred to the leader of a business enterprise, the same 
phrase is never found in the Corpus of Founding Era American 
English to refer to a business leader but only referred to a leader of a 
governmental body. Thus, it seems unlikely that those who drafted 
and ratified the Constitution would have thought of “the executive 
power” vested in the President as comparable to the authority 
exercised by a business executive over a private company. Even 
                                                                                                                                             
 25.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 26.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
 27.  Miller & Obelgoner, supra note 18. See commentary on the working paper version of this article 
by Michigan law professor Julian Davis Mortenson, who has written extensively on the meaning of 
“executive power,” and Edward Finegan, Professor of Linguistics and Law, Emeritus, University of 
Southern California at Workshop Website, supra note 16. 
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more fundamentally, their linguistic and historical research converge 
on the finding that “executive power” in the Founding Era likely had 
only the limited meaning of “power to execute laws.” 
The final article in this issue, “We the Citizens?”: A Corpus 
Linguistic Inquiry into the Use of “People” and “Citizens” in the 
Founding Era,28 began as a graduate research project by Abigail 
Stout and Diana Coetzee using corpus linguistics to study the original 
meaning of “powers . . . reserved . . . to the people”29 in the Tenth 
Amendment. As they expanded their research into this article and 
were joined by linguistics professor Ute Römer, the interdisciplinary 
team became intrigued by the prevalence of the phrase “the people” 
in the Constitution in contrast to “the citizens.” The Constitution 
famously begins with the words “We the People,” and while the 
First, Second, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendment all refer to “the 
people,” the word citizen appears nowhere in the Bill of Rights. The 
team specifically examined both collocate words and fixed phrases 
found surrounding the words people and citizens, using both the 
Corpus of Founding Era American English and a corpus consisting 
of the public papers of James Madison. This study allowed them to 
discover more about the “roles” that each party (i.e., people and 
citizens) played and the kinds of actions each party was associated 
with. They found that although the verbs elected, chosen, and made 
were used with both words (e.g., “elected by the people/citizens,” 
“chosen by the people/citizens,” and “made by the people/citizens”), 
these verbs were much more commonly combined with people than 
with citizens. Their findings thus suggest  that (1) people 
predominates over citizens when referring to governing in the 
Founding Era; (2) the actions of people—electing, choosing, and 
making—were wider in their scope than those of citizens; and, 
ultimately, (3) the people were understood as the ground-up source of 
power for the establishment of the Constitution. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                             
 28.  Abigail Stout, Diana Coetzee & Ute Römer, “We the Citizens?”: A Corpus Linguistic Inquiry 
into the Use of “People” and “Citizens” in the Founding Era, infra 36 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 663 (2020). 
 29.  U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
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